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THE DESTRUCTION OF BUDDHAS: DISSONANT HERITAGE, 
RELIGIOUS OR POLITICAL ICONOCLASM?
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This article attempts to explore the main impulses that might have led to the destruction of Buddha 
statues by Taliban in the Bamiyan Valley of Afghanistan. Drawing on existing literature, and anec-
dotal evidence, this article suggests that the main impulses that have led to destruction are rather 
linked to the overall political context of that time (i.e., political iconoclasm) rather than to pure 
Islamic iconoclasm or an explicit condition of disharmony in heritage (i.e., dissonant heritage). First, 
the Taliban did not consider the statues as “their” cultural heritage. The act of destruction, therefore, 
cannot be subscribed to the Afghan cultural dynamics but rather to the political–religious ideology 
imported by Taliban from outside of the country. Secondly, it seemed that Mullah Omar was view-
ing the statues as a revenue source at the beginning and as a political bargain chip at the end. In 
both circumstances, religion seems not to have played the main role. Lastly, the destruction seems 
a political iconoclasm—that is, a political exploitation, if not a direct political act. The Taliban and 
especially their external allies were very well aware of the consequences of the act of destruction. 
It seems implausible to suggest that there were no religion and/or culture in play when ordering the 
destruction of the statues. The latter is the least what this article aims for. However, to conclude that 
the destruction was solely triggered by theological and cultural factors might also be improbable. 
The author does not, in any way, attempt to rationalize the act of destruction, let alone justify the 
barbaric act.
Key words: Afghanistan; Bamiyan Buddhas; Dissonant heritage; Consonant heritage; 
Islamic iconoclasm; Political iconoclasm; Religious iconoclasm
Introduction
Afghanistan has been a cultural, ethnic, and 
linguistic crossroads throughout its history, 
thanks to its geographical position and ancient 
trade routes.
On the ancient Silk Road, about 250 km northwest 
of capital Kabul lies the Bamiyan Valley where two 
6th century monumental statues of standing Bud-
dha were carved into the side of a cliff. The statues 
survived earlier destruction attempts of Genghis 
Khan’s army, Aurangzeb (the Mughal emperor), 
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the Persian king Nader Afshar, and the Afghan king 
Abdur Rahman. The larger statue is called Salsal 
while the smaller (female) is called Shamama by 
locals and in Afghan literature (Reza’Husseini, 
2012). The statues that were once hinted as visit-
ing spot for international tourists even by the most 
zealot Muslim and reclusive leader of the Taliban, 
Mullah Omar, who later ordered their destruction, 
had been viewed as an important part of Afghan 
small tourism industry (Elias, 2007). In March 
2001, the Taliban destroyed the two giant statues. 
The destruction, which was condemned by almost 
all nation-states and institutions, and was called a 
crime against culture and history further isolated 
the Taliban government, which was officially rec-
ognized only by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the 
UAE.
The Taliban are groups of fundamentalist Sunni 
Muslim militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
The Taliban held power in Afghanistan from 1996 
to 2001. The Taliban are Afghan refugee children 
mostly born and/or grew up in Pakistan. They were 
educated in Saudi-financed madrassas in Pakistan 
that teach Wahhabism, a rigid form of Islam that 
is rooted in Saudi Arabia. The Pakistan’s Inter-
Services Intelligence (ISI) and military are widely 
alleged by international community and even peo-
ple inside Pakistan for founding, supporting, and 
providing safe heavens to (Afghan) Taliban. To 
gain strategic depth, the ISI and the military used 
the Taliban to install a regime in Afghanistan that 
would be favorable to Pakistan, and give financial, 
logistical, and military support to the Taliban (Gard-
ner, 2007; Giraldo, 2007; Hilali, 2005). Taliban are 
considered as a proxy serving the interests of the 
Pakistan ISI and the military, which favor a disin-
tegrated Afghanistan. In addition, the influence of 
Al-Qaeda on Taliban’s policy is also undeniable.
The discourse that followed the destruction of the 
statues seems to be lacking convincing evidence of 
the main factors that might have led to the destruc-
tion. Commonly, the destruction is perceived to be 
an act of religious iconoclasm while others have 
placed it in the context of “dissonant heritage.”
There may be little doubt that Islamic iconoclasm 
(Centlivres, 2008; Francioni & Lenzerini, 2003; 
Meskell, 2002; R. P. B. Singh, 2008) and Taliban’s 
discordance with the statues (Ashworth & Van 
der Aa, 2002; Hampton, 2005; Isaac & Budryte-
Ausiejiene, 2015) might have contributed to the 
destruction. However, the anecdotal evidence, tim-
ing, and the way the destruction was carried out 
suggest that the main factors that might have con-
tributed to Mullah Omar’s decision are rather more 
complex and multidimensional.
Consistent with previous authors (Colwell- 
Chanthaphonh, 2003; Dupree, 2002; Flood, 2002; 
Gamboni, 2001; Janowski, 2011; Reza’Husseini, 
2012) this article argues that the destruction was 
rather linked to the overall (immediate) politi-
cal context than to pure Islamic iconoclasm or an 
explicit condition of disharmony in heritage.
This article contributes to the existing literature 
as follows. The findings reveal that any iconoclas-
tic acts should be studied in an overall multidimen-
sional context. Therefore, relating the destruction 
of the statues to solely theological and cultural 
impulses might be both premature and improbable.
To the knowledge of the author this is the first 
article that explores the impulses of the destruction 
where an extended amount of both existing national 
and international literature has been reviewed. In 
addition, this article distinguishes itself from exist-
ing related literature by using new national and 
local sources, both written and audio visual.
Literature Review
Dissonant Heritage
Heritage is considered dissonant when differ-
ent groups, based on their beliefs, religion, culture, 
or political interest, attribute different stories to a 
certain object or landscape. The concept of “dis-
sonant heritage” was pioneered by Tunbridge and 
Ashworth (1996). Dissonant heritage looks at the 
“ways in which the past can be used as a resource in 
present conflict situations” (p. 21). Tunbridge and 
Ashworth (1996) defined “ ‘heritage dissonance’ as 
a condition of discordance or lack of agreement and 
consistency as to the meaning of heritage” (p. 21).
Chhabra (2012) claimd that “the existence of 
multiple ethnic communities” may result in disso-
nant point of views “which differ within and with 
the mainstream population” (p. 1702). Meskell 
(2002) defined dissonant heritage as “heritage that 
does not conform to prevailing norms or sites that 
are inherently disturbing” (p. 566).
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Dissonant heritage used in the context of this 
article is also rather analogous to negative heritage 
(Meskell, 2002), unwanted heritage, and unwanted 
past (Light, 2000). The term “consonant heritage,” 
on the other hand, is used in this article as ant-
onym to dissonant heritage. Consonant heritage, 
therefore, does conform to the norms, is not dis-
turbing at all, is cherished and preserved. It should 
be noted that the term consonant heritage is nei-
ther a common concept nor a new one created by 
the author. The term is used here to only illustrate 
what could be considered as opposite to dissonant 
heritage.
Iconoclasm
Iconoclasm refers to an act of deliberately 
attacking, rejecting, or destroying (religious or 
cultural) images (Aston, 1988; Barnard, 1974; 
Gamboni, 1997; Martin, 1930) or visual represen-
tations. According to the World Heritage Encyclo-
pedia, iconoclasm is “opposition to the veneration 
of inanimate representations, religious icons, and 
other symbols or monuments. In time, the word has 
also come to refer to the opposition to institutional 
inertia in one’s own culture, usually for religious or 
political motives” (http://www.worldheritage.org/
article/WHEBN0000015085/Iconoclasm).
The first iconoclast on record is believed to be 
Moses (Sartwell, 2001). Despite the fact that com-
petition over images can be traced back as far as 
Plato’s dialogues (Eatough, 2010; Sartwell, 2001), 
the term iconoclasm is believed to be emerged in 
8th century Christian Byzantine Empire (Eatough, 
2010; Mercadal, 2015). Since then, the depredation 
of the Reformation and the events of the French 
Revolution could be referred to as Christian icono-
clasm (Flood, 2002; van‘t Hof, 1998). In fact, the 
Dutch term “Beeldenstorm” that simply means 
“statues storm” refers to the wave of attacks that 
took place in the summer of 1566 (Historisch-nieu-
wsblad, 2005).
Oleg Graber (as cited in May & Berlejung, 2012) 
claims that “the most obvious difference between 
Bazyntine and Islamic iconoclasm is that the for-
mer is usually spelled with a capital ‘I’ and the lat-
ter with a small ‘I’ ” (p. 8). However, according to 
May and Berlejung (2012), “The primary and most 
obvious difference between European iconoclasm, 
including that of Byzantium, and Near Eastern 
iconoclasm of all epochs is that the Byzantine and 
other Christians demolished images of their own 
god, not the god (or gods) of others” (p. 8).
According to Centlivres (2008), the revolution-
ary iconoclasm during the Great Cultural Revolu-
tion “destroyed Buddhist temples and images in 
Mongolia, Tibet and other places in Maoist China” 
(p, 2). In comparison to the latter, “nothing hap-
pened in Afghanistan” argued Centlivres (2008, 
p. 2).
The term iconoclasm used in this article is 
derived from the factors (i.e., cultural, theologi-
cal, and political) causing, or motivations behind, 
the iconoclastic act rather the agent carrying out 
the act of destruction. Besides, this article distin-
guishes (pure) Islamic iconoclasm from political 
iconoclasm. Political iconoclasm in the context of 
this article includes all factors, including economic 
ones that have led to the destruction of the statues, 
except theological and cultural factors. This article, 
therefore, explicitly assumes Islam and politics as 
separate undertakings, which could be considered 
as limitation of this article.
Islamic Iconoclasm
Islamic iconoclasm in the context of this article 
is defined as act of attacking, rejecting, or destroy-
ing religious or cultural images, stemming solely 
from Islamic traditions, including Hadith. There-
fore, the term Islamic iconoclasm as used in this 
article does not necessarily mean any iconoclastic 
act carried out by Muslims.
Islam, like other religions, has generally adopted 
a position opposed to certain visual and physical 
representations. This opposition, however, is not 
based on the Qur’an, but rather on various traditions 
derived from the Hadith (accounts of things said 
and done by the Prophet Mohammad) (Brubaker, 
2009; Flood, 2002).
The Hadith includes statements such as, “Angels 
do not enter a house in which there are dogs or pic-
tures” (Sahih-Al-Bukhari, 7.833, narrated by Abu 
Talha) or “The people who will receive the severest 
punishment from Allah will be the picture makers” 
(Al-Bukhari, 7834, narrated by Muslim) or “The 
makers of these pictures will be punished on the 
Day of Resurrection and it will be said to them, 
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‘Make alive what you have created” (Al-Bukhari, 
7.840, narrated by Ayesha).
Muslim scholars are believed to be having some 
disagreements in interpretations of Hadiths and, 
as a consequence, the opposition to figural repre-
sentation differs over time and varies significantly 
among different Islamic (sub)sects.
Allen (1988) wrote, “I prefer to term the Islamic 
phenomenon not iconoclasm, the rejection of 
images, but aniconism, the nonuse of images” 
(p. 3).
The very first and symbolic act of Islamic icono-
clasm is believed to be the act of removing idols 
from the Ka’ba in Mecca by the Prophet Moham-
mad, and recent examples are perceived to be the 
destruction of Buddha status in Afghanistan and 
destruction of cultural heritage sites by Islamic 
State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Iraq, Syria, 
and Libya.
Political Iconoclasm
Political iconoclasm in the context of this article 
refers to any iconoclastic act carried out to achieve 
or manifest political objectives. Carrying out icon-
oclastic acts in a political context may also include 
achieving or manifesting other objectives such as 
economic and military, but it excludes any theo-
logical or cultural impulses.
According to W.J. Thomas Mitchell (as cited in 
May & Berlejung, 2012), “Iconoclasm is always 
about politics” (p. 3). On the contrary May and 
Berlejung (2012) argued that “It is the motivation 
and the objective behind the act of destruction that 
makes an act iconoclastic, be this objective politi-
cal, religious, magical, economic or an interlacing 
of all these” (p. 3). Besides, May and Berlejung 
(2012) doubt whether “iconoclasm is always about 
politics” will be “applicable to entire history of 
humankind” (p. 11).
According to James Noyes (as cited in Meinema, 
2013), “the intended destruction of idols not only 
has religious, but also significant political effects, 
in the sense that it unites the adherents of the ‘True 
God’ under an often much more centralized ‘True 
Government’.” Moreover, James Noyes contends 
that iconoclasm is “related to state-building, such 
as in the Protestant Reformation, the French Revo-
lution, or the Islamic reformist movement of Shaikh 
Muhammad bin Abdul-Wahhab, that united with 
the Najdi al-Saud family to lay the foundations for 
the modern Saudi Arabian state” (Meinema, 2013).
Reviewing Noyes (2013), Adam Deville (2014) 
writes that:
any outbreak of iconoclasm–whether in Calvin-
ist Geneva, Wahhabist Afghanistan, revolution-
ary France, Nazi Germany, or the Balkans in the 
1990s–is always the prelude to political recon-
figurations and the emergence of a new state or 
new state actors. The theological arguments about 
icons and iconoclasm are in fact secondary in this 
book.
Deville (2014) also notes that in many cases it is 
difficult if not impossible to isolate one single cause 
of, or reason for, iconoclasm, but that it is often 
motivated by a tangle of theopolitical reasons.
George (2009) argued that, “Yet iconoclasm in 
Islamic communities, like iconoclasm in Western 
and largely Christian contexts, typically springs 
from crises and changes in politics and rule” 
(p. 591).
To manifest their political and military powers, 
agent(s) may search for publicity to expose their 
iconoclastic acts. The destruction of the statues is a 
modern examples of “publically staged, politicized 
acts of iconoclasm” (May & Berlejung, 2012, p. 
335). Furthermore, self-enrichment, among others, 
may also motivate iconoclasm. Indeed, Miles and 
Mclennan (2001) argued that “the most dangerous 
religion in the world, at least for art, remains the 
religion of the market.”
Discussion
Dissonant Heritage?
The Bamyian Buddha statues were part of the 
cultural heritage of Afghanistan (Azmoone-melli, 
2013; Elias, 2007), and Afghans had been trying 
to inscribe this and some other sites on the World 
Heritage list. Indeed, the Afghan government nom-
inated the site to the World Heritage list in 1983 
(Ashworth & Van der Aa, 2002; The World Heri-
tage Newsletter, 2001). Besides, the statues had 
been viewed as an important part of Afghanistan’s 
small tourist industry and had been promoted as a 
symbol of Afghanistan’s long heritage, appearing 
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on postage stamps and state-produced cultural pub-
lications long before the Soviet invasion of Afghan-
istan in 1979 (Elias, 2007). An earlier attempt in 
1983 by the then government to inscribe the site on 
the World Heritage list was deferred by the World 
Heritage Committee (The World Heritage Newslet-
ter, 2001). While questioning the exclusion of the 
site from “the increasingly lengthy list of ‘World 
Heritage Sites’ of UNESCO,” Ashworth and Van 
der Aa (2002, p. 448) posed the question whether 
the destruction would still have taken place if the 
valley had been inscribed as World Heritage site. 
Finally, the cultural landscape and archaeologi-
cal remains of the valley was inscribed as a World 
Heritage site in 2003—just 2 years after the destruc-
tion of the statues.
Afghanistan is a country with different ethnic 
communities, different Islamic denominations, and 
even different (sub)cultures. Therefore, the “con-
dition of discordance or lack of agreement and 
consistency” (Tunbridge & Ashworth, 1996, p. 
21) regarding the statues is perceived to exist 
(Ashworth & Van der Aa, 2002; Chhabra, 2012; 
Hampton, 2005; Meskell, 2002), which is bound to 
result in dissonant perspectives. However, despite 
significant differences in their attitudes towards the 
statues, an overwhelming majority of Afghans from 
different religions and different ethnical groups con-
sider the statues as their heritage (Azmoone-melli, 
2013; Elias, 2007). Therefore, the act of destruction 
cannot be simply subscribed to the Afghan cultural 
dynamics.
This article does not reject that “dissonant per-
spective of the Taliban” might have led to the 
destruction. However, based on the arguments put 
in order below, it might also be implausible to con-
clude that the destruction was a direct result of dis-
sonant perspective.
i. The Taliban have never considered the statues or 
any other pre-Islamic artefacts as “their” heritage. 
Indeed, Mullah Omar was once quoted referring 
to the statues as “stones” (Coll, 2004, p.554), a 
term that is assigned to something meaningless 
or unimportant in Afghan terminology. Mul-
lah Omar, therefore, did not consider or attri-
bute any meanings, albeit positive or negative, 
or importance to the statues in the first place. 
Thus, for him, the statues were not disturbing, 
and, therefore, the “condition of discordance or 
lack of agreement and consistency” did not exist 
at all. Moreover, most Afghans do not consider 
Taliban being Afghans in the first place. Taliban 
were Afghan refugee children mostly born and 
grown up in Pakistan. They were educated in 
Saudi-financed madrassas in Pakistan that teach 
Wahhabism, a rigid form of Islam that is rooted 
in Saudi Arabia.
ii. Indeed, in July 1999 Mullah Omar issued a 
decree that said the statues shall not be destroyed 
but protected (Constable, 2001; Harding, 2001), 
and considered them as a potential major source 
of income for Afghanistan from international 
tourists (Harding, 2001). However, in February 
2001 Mullah Omar issued a new decree calling 
for all ancient statues to be destroyed (Colwell-
Chanthaphonh, 2003; Constable, 2001; Harding, 
2001). The timing of the second decree, and the 
fact that it rejects the earlier edict, suggests that 
the destruction had more to do with the “Tali-
ban’s immediate relation to the international 
community” (Flood, 2002, p. 651) and/or with 
the “political context, to the progressive isolation 
of the Taliban” (Centlivres, 2008, p. 4) and less 
with dissonant perspectives of the Taliban.
iii. Some analysts suggest that the destruction was 
aimed at punishing and humiliating the Taliban’s 
opposition groups, especially the local Shiite 
Hazara ethnic group (Constable, 2001; Rathje, 
2001; Reza’Husseini, 2012; Vijh, 2007). These 
suggestions, which might be correct to a certain 
degree, have more to do with achieving political 
or military manifestations by the Taliban than 
with their view of dissonant heritage. As Flood 
(2002) suggested, “the intended audience for this 
communique was neither divine nor local but 
global: for all its recidivist rhetoric, this was a 
performance designed for the age of the Inter-
net” (p. 651). It should be noted that almost all 
ordinary Afghans, regardless of their ethnical 
background, were shocked by the destruction of 
statues (Bucherer, n.d.; Constable, 2001). Paul 
Bucherer (Director of the Afghanistan Institute 
and Museum, Bibliotheca Afghanica in Switzer-
land.) disagreed that the destruction of the stat-
ues only harmed the Shia Hazara community in 
Afghanistan, and notes that, “This is simply not 
correct. I was in the Pashtun area of Mehtar Lam 
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and I spoke to the Pashtuns about the destruction 
of the Buddhas in Bamiyan and tears came to their 
eyes and they started to cry about the loss of this 
national cultural heritage” (Bucherer, n.d.). It 
seems unlikely that the statue were destroyed in 
order to get back at the Hazaras, because the monu-
ments held no ritual significance for them. Besides, 
the Taliban have rarely resorted to symbolic 
actions when more direct ones were available.
The statues were meaningless—“the stones” 
to the Taliban. For them, therefore, they were not 
heritage in the first place, let alone dissonant heri-
tage or consonant heritage. The act of destruction, 
therefore, cannot be subscribe to the Afghan cul-
tural dynamics, but rather to the political–religious 
ideology of the Taliban.
Islamic Iconoclasm?
Islamic iconoclasm in the context of this arti-
cle is defined as act of attacking, rejecting, or 
destroying religious or cultural images, stemming 
solely from Islamic traditions, including Hadith. 
It is worth mentioning that this article does not, 
in any way, suggest that Islamic interpretations 
have played no role in the destruction of the stat-
ues. Indeed, the one issuing the decree of destruc-
tion and the very individuals carrying out the act 
of destruction were all zealot Muslims. However, 
based on the arguments put in order below, it 
seems implausible to conclude that the destruction 
was a direct result of Islamic iconoclasm.
i. The shift from protection to destruction of the 
statues by the Taliban is a phenomenon that needs 
to be further analyzed. The evidence shows that 
Taliban are very uncompromising as far as the 
implementation of Sharia or any Islamic decree 
is concerned. In his first decree, issued in July 
1999, Mullah Omar reasoned the nonexistence 
of worshippers and the future economic benefits 
from international visitors to protect the statues 
(Bucherer, n.d.; Burke, 2001; Harding, 2001). 
This inconsistency (i.e., from protection to a sud-
den destruction) seems very odd.
ii. Because the statues were belonging to a pre-
Islamic era, and there were no Buddhists left in 
Afghanistan, the Afghans and even the Taliban 
did not perceived them as threat to Islam. Even 
the great Iconoclast Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna 
had spared the statues while destroying the 
Shiva temple at Somnath, Gujrat, in 1025 CE 
(Elias, 2007). The reason might be simple—
the Bamiyan statues were not worshipped. It is 
also improbable to assume that despite a short 
distance between Ghazna and Bamyian, Sultan 
Mahmud of Ghazna was unaware of the existence 
of the statues. So it was clear, even to Mullah 
Omar, that the statues had no religious function 
at all. Therefore, destroying them would also 
serve no religious purposes. Coll (2004) wrote 
that when Mullah Omar was asked, “When 
they have spared these statues for fifteen hun-
dred years, all these Muslims who have passed 
by them, how are you a different Muslim 
from them,” Mullah Omar perceivably replied 
“Maybe they did not have the technology to 
destroy them” (p. 554). This postdestruction 
remark seems an irrational answer to justify the 
action already taken and the consequent damage 
already done rather than technology being the 
main factor in destruction. The Taliban had the 
same technology from the outset, and, if they 
wanted to destroy the statues, they could do so 
using the same technology in 1998.
iii. The very question that needs an answer is what 
made Mullah Omar, and especially after almost 
2 years, to change his mind from protection to 
destruction. If the theological issues were at 
stake, taking Taliban’s very strict and uncompro-
mising view of Islam into account, Mullah Omar 
would have not hesitated to destroy the statues at 
the outset rather than protecting them. Therefore, 
there should have been more reasons, next to 
the theological ones, to just do the opposite. The 
almost 3-year time gap between the capture of 
the Bamiyan Valley in 1998 and the destruction 
in 2001 is an important point of discussion. The 
question that arises is why Mullah Omar waited 
so long to destroy the statues when he had all the 
means to destroy them even in 1998. The answer 
may lie in the overall (immediate) political con-
text in which the Taliban were in at the beginning 
of 2001 (i.e., just prior to the destruction).
iv. Elias (2007) argued that the Hijri calendar has 
played a role in the proceedings. According to 
Elias (2007), the timing of the second decree 
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ordering destruction of the statues might have 
been influenced by the sacred period of Hajj 
pilgrimage and Eid al-adha. However, Hajj pil-
grimage and Eid al-adha are reoccurring events 
that take place very year, thus not only in 2001. 
Therefore, if these events would have played a 
role, they would surely have done so also in the 
previous years.
It seemed that Mullah Omar was viewing the 
statues as a revenue source at the beginning and 
as a political bargain chip at the end. In both cir-
cumstances, religion seems not to have played the 
main role.
Political Iconoclasm?
Political iconoclasm in the context of this arti-
cle refers to any iconoclastic act carried out to 
achieve or manifest political objectives. Carrying 
out an iconoclastic act in a political context may 
also include achieving or manifesting other objec-
tives such as economic and military, but it excludes 
any theological or cultural impulses. As far as the 
underlying impulses that have led to the destruction 
are concerned, this article explicitly assumes Islam 
and politics being separate undertakings rather than 
a joint enterprise.
The evidence, timing, and the arguments put in 
order below suggest that politics, albeit irrational, 
might have been the main, if not the only, impulse 
for Mullah Omar to order the destruction of the 
statues.
i. The Taliban were completely isolated on the 
international scene (Frei, 2005). Officially they 
were only recognized by Pakistan, Saudi Ara-
bia, and UAE. Internationally, both Pakistan and 
Saudi Arabia are accused of direct military and 
financial assistance to the Taliban, respectively. 
The Taliban regime was facing increased UN 
sanctions, after the regimes’ rejection to extradite 
terrorist leader Osama bin Laden (Romey, 2001). 
Dario Gamboni relates the decision to destroy 
the statues to “Taliban’s frustration at failing to 
achieve international recognition and to the eco-
nomic sanctions imposed upon the country by 
the UN because of its alleged links to Islamic 
terrorism” (Gamboni, 2001). According to some 
commentators Mullah Omar had spared the stat-
ues for several years in the hope of improving 
relations with the West. However, the increased 
pressure convinced him that he had nothing left to 
lose. “His response to the rest of the world: If you 
want the monuments to survive, then recognize 
us as we are” (The Arts Journal, 2001). The deci-
sion to destroy the statues is therefore perceived 
to be a defiant reaction to international commu-
nity and/or international sanctions (Burke, 2001; 
Carraso, 2015; Harding, 2001; Romey, 2001; 
Saikal & Ramesh, 2001; K. Singh, n.d.; R. P. B. 
Singh, 2008). For the Taliban it was setting their 
political agenda (Frei, 2005).
ii. The Taliban’s isolated regime was attempting 
to find ways to draw global attention. However, 
it seemed that the regime was failing in almost 
all fronts. Some commentators suggest that the 
destruction was carried out to attract global 
attention or international publicity (Colwell-
Chanthaphonh, 2003; Flood, 2002; Francioni & 
Lenzerini, 2003; Janowski, 2011; Meskell, 2002; 
Semple, 2011) which despite being an “irrepa-
rable loss for all mankind” seemed successful 
to a certain degree. According to Semple, Tali-
ban “had found a brilliant source of international 
publicity where it could strike a successful pose 
of defiance” (Semple, 2011).
iii. The influence of Al-Qaeda, Pakistan’s ISI, and 
other external players on Taliban’s policy is unde-
niable. Taliban are considered as a proxy serving 
the interests of certain elements inside Pakistan 
that may favor a disintegrated Afghanistan. A 
united Afghanistan, culturally or otherwise, is 
falsely perceived as threat to Pakistan by certain 
elements inside Pakistan military and security 
services. As a result, some commentators suggest 
that the destruction was influenced or inspired 
by Al-Qaida and/or Pakistani (ISI) elements 
(Behzad, 2010; Burke, 2001; Faizi, 2010; Flood, 
2002; Frei, 2005; Janowski, 2011; Muzhda, 2005; 
Rathje, 2001; Semple, 2011; K. Singh, n.d.; Vijh, 
2007). Some commentators even suggest that 
destruction itself might have been carried out by 
Al-Qaeda and Pakistani elements (Bucherer, n.d.; 
Frei, 2005; Semple, 2011). Therefore, it was not 
a surprise that Pakistan was the only country, if 
not the whole country, where the destruction was 
celebrated or received as good news by certain 
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elements (Elias, 2007; Reuters, 2001; K. Singh, 
n.d.).
iv. Some other commentators consider the destruc-
tion as a response of the Taliban to the favoritism 
of West towards the protection of the statue over 
the human sufferings in Afghanistan (Centlivres, 
2008; Crossette, 2001; Gamboni, 1997; May & 
Berlejung, 2012).
v. According to some sources the destruction was 
a response (of certain Pakistani elements) to the 
destruction of Babri Mosque in India by Hindu 
extremists (Bernbeck, 2013; Elias, 2007).
vi. Others perceive the destruction a way to punish 
and humiliate the Taliban’s opposition groups, 
especially the local Shiite Hazara ethnic group 
(Constable, 2001; Rathje, 2001; Reza’Husseini, 
2012; Vijh, 2007)
vii. Lastly, some commentators suggest that the 
order to destroy all idols, including the statues, 
were given as a part of a large scale smuggling 
of artefacts, especially to Pakistan (Gamboni, 
2001; Miles & McLennan, 2001; Naderi, 2012). 
As Gambani (2001) wrote, “According to some 
commentators, the order to destroy idols served 
to cover up the widespread smuggling of valu-
able pre-Islamic artefacts out of the country, 
especially toward Pakistan—smuggling that 
could only be carried out with the connivance of 
Taliban authorities.”
The destruction seems a political iconoclasm—
that is, a political exploitation, if not a direct political 
act. The Taliban and especially their external allies 
were very well aware of the consequences of the act 
of destruction. As Janowski (2011) put it convinc-
ingly, “Given the attendant costs, the question of 
the Taliban’s motivation is an interesting one, and 
it seems both too easy and even quite misguided to 
dismiss the Taliban as unthinking zealots” (p. 58).
Conclusion
This article does not attempt to rationalize the 
barbaric act of the destruction of Buddha statues 
in Bamiyan Vally. It neither attempts to ignore the 
significance of theological and cultural impulses 
that may have led to the destruction by the Tali-
ban. However, it suggests that politics rather than 
religion and culture might have been the main, if 
not the only, impulse for the Taliban to destroy the 
statues and other idols in Afghanistan.
As far the heritage, the Taliban have never con-
sidered the statues as their past, neither good nor 
bad. For them, the statues were meaningless objects 
that may serve their potential political or economic 
objectives. The act of destruction, therefore, can-
not be subscribed to the Afghan cultural dynamics 
but rather to the political–religious ideology of the 
Taliban.
The Taliban were not anymore the zealot Mus-
lims who only knew religion. They were learning 
politics, thought and facilitated by Al-Qaeda and 
ISI. The Taliban understood that what they were 
destroying were not religious icons (Flood, 2002). 
They were exploiting politics (Dupree, 2002), albeit 
irrational politics (Vijh, 2007).
The explicit assumption of Islam, politics and 
culture being separate undertakings is rather an 
inconsistency with some existing literature and a 
limitation of the current article.
Further research on the impulses that may have 
led to the destruction is needed, and any explicit 
conclusion relating to the destruction to one single 
impulse might be both premature and implausible. 
Information from the “surrendered” insiders such 
as Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, Taliban’s ambas-
sador to Pakistan, and Wakil Ahmad Muttawakil, 
Taliban’s foreign minister, might be helpful to get 
deeper insights into the motivations and impulses 
of the destruction.
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